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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper presents the perspective of private industry on an often emotionally
charged subject. The disputes and debates that have erupted globally over the use
and development of biotechnology reflect an environmental consciousness that has
arisen within our lifetime. They also come at a very significant time in the evolution
of global institutions and the development of their capacity to cope with challenging
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and complex issues that transcend national boundaries. The kind of debate and
questions raised are fair and need serious addressing. They reflect a growing
antipathy towards the evolving international regime, a "backlash" to
globalization-or at least the manifestation of globalization we see in the growth
and development of global companies.
Globalization, however, is much broader than just the proliferation of
multinational corporations. One aspect of the backlash is the challenge to global
enterprises' legitimate role in decisions regarding products, raising complex
questions of ownership, fair prices, and the fundamental economic structure within
which we operate. Similarly, the debate that preceded the adoption of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety' is exactly the kind of debate that needs to happen. Indeed, the
debate needs to be enriched by a much broader level of participation, particularly
since many of the voices that are willing to criticize the Protocol's weaknesses were
not heard during its formation. In fact, the negotiations saw very little outside
participation until very near the end.
This paper focuses on the outcome in this particular dialogue, the Cartagena
Protocol. It provides a perspective of how at least one company views the
Protocol-a company that has a significant stake in these issues. In the past few
years, DuPont has greatly increased its presence in the biotechnology arena. We
have acquired Pioneer Hybrid, one of the world's leading seed companies, and
Protein Technology International, a company that specializes in developing
applications of soy protein. We are actively involved in pharmaceuticals and
industrial applications of biotechnology. We believe there is a great deal of potential
in the advance of biotechnology, but we also understand that there are enormous
questions of emotion and value involved.
II. ROAD TO THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL

A. Convention on BiologicalDiversity
The Protocol arose from the Convention on Biological Diversity which itself
was the result of the Rio Conference held in June of 1992.2 The Convention has
been ratified by many nations and is in force internationally, although it has not been
ratified by the United States. The goal of the Convention is the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and a fair and equitable
sharing of benefits.
Evolving from the Convention was the Jakarta Mandate in November 1995. The
Mandate prescribed the development of a protocol focusing specifically on the

1.
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M.
1027, available at http:/Iwww.biodiv.orglbiosafety/protocol.asp (visited Apr. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Protocol].
2.
United Nations Conference On Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M, 818 [hereinafter CBD].
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transboundary movement of any Living Modified Organism (LMO) resulting from
modem biotechnology that may have adverse effect on the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity. The envisioned protocol was to set out for
consideration, in particular, appropriate procedures for advance informed agreement
(AIA). The round of talks in Montreal and the resulting Protocol were in response
to that mandate.
B. Setting Stagefor Stormy Passage
The protocol was to be a multilateral environmental agreement, establishing an
international legal regime for the development and distribution of LMOs. From our
perspective, the stage was set for a stormy passage early-on because the Protocol
was deemed an environmental exercise by many countries. It was sponsored by the
United Nations Environment Program; the European Union and most countries do
consider it a multilateral environmental agreement.
By and large, most of the countries came to the table with their environment
ministries, leaving their agricultural ministries at home. Lacking was the kind of
interdisciplinary and/or interagency process that the United States and a number of
other countries use in negotiation of these types of international agreements ensuring
that all the interests of a particular country and society are integrated. The fact that
most countries did not involve their agricultural ministries is also important because
much of the Protocol is focused on agricultural applications. The individuals in
those ministries have the expertise regarding application of the existing international
agriculture and food safety instruments. On the other hand, among the environment
ministry participants, in some cases there was very little involvement and awareness
of those existing instruments.
Partially because of this limited participation, the underlying notion that most
of the countries brought to the table was that genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) are inherently dangerous. DuPont views the potential risks of GMOs
differently. There are potential risks associated with GMOs, and certainly in the case
of agricultural applications, but we believe these risks are controllable. Where
preeminent scientific panels have evaluated these risks, they have found them not
different in kind from risks associated with, for example, plants bred through other
mechanisms or exotic species introduced into countries. The corollary is that a lot
of the tools and mechanisms that have evolved to control those kinds of risks are in
fact already contributing to risk management with this particular type of technology.
The nature and identity of the participants set up a dynamic in which the United
States and other large agricultural exporters faced off, with the remaining nations
mostly concerned with environmental issues. The lack of representation from
agricultural concerns further meant that at first little attention was being paid to the
existing legal regime in favor of addressing the range of concerns afresh.
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C. Turning the Tide
The conflicting points of view made for little progress in the talks. The process
of negotiation broke down in Cartagena, as several coalition groups were formed,
including groups from the European Union, Central and Eastern Europe and others.
It was a significant turning point in the course of the negotiations when the so-called
Miami group was formed to represent the interests of agricultural exporters. This
changed the dynamic of the negotiations significantly.3 The group's position did
contribute to the failure of the negotiations in Cartagena. From our perspective, part
of that failure was also the fact that the negotiators had a poorly designed
instrument-an inferior instrument-at that point. These failures almost lead to the
demise of the Protocol entirely.
The Protocol was resurrected from the ashes, almost literally, by Chairman Juan
Mayr from Columbia. One cannot overstate the importance this individual had in
leading the resurrection of the Protocol process. Mayr developed and applied what
came to be know as the "Vienna Format" of negotiation (named for the city at which
he first applied the format). This format of negotiations involved structured dialogue
among the chairs and leadership of each of the coalition groups. It also kept the
negotiators organized. More importantly, he isolated a series of key issues, helping
define the scope of the Protocol. These included application of the AIA, notification,
handling, transport, packaging and identification of GMOs, application of the
Protocol to non-parties, non-discrimination illegal transboundary movement, SocioEconomic considerations, and the relationship of the Protocol with other
international instruments.
This isolation of distinct issues allowed the various coalitions to focus on what
evolved into a very clear definition of certain bottom line issues that were the
subject of a final round of negotiation. Some of the important issues dropped by the
wayside: the issue of pharmaceuticals, which was brought up in an effort to redefine
contained use, was abandoned; an effort by the seeds companies, including ours, to
define an expedited procedure for research and development for registering seeds
was also abandoned. In the end, the relation of the protocol to other instruments,
versus the World Trade Organization (WTO), and in particular the sanitary and
phytosanitary standards of the WTO, and certainly the precautionary language
related to that, became the foci of the negotiations.
Also discussed was the commodities issue-the question of what you do with
grains destined for global commodity markets that are developed through living
modified organisms. There was a final agreement on a process for early notification
through a clearinghouse mechanism that would require notification whenever
something was approved to be grown commercially that would ultimately feed into
the commodities' system. There were significant differences over how to act on that,

3.

The Miami Group consisted of the US, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.
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and differences over the question of how you would document movement of your
commodities under the agreement.
The clearinghouse provision and related shipping documentation requirements
were the final piece of the puzzle, and the Protocol was finally approved by
unanimous consensus in the late hours of Saturday morning on January 29, 2000.
The official document was to be open for signatures on May 15, 2000. Ratification
will require approval by fifty countries.
III. APPLICATION OF THE PROTOCOL

A. Scope of the Protocol
1. Definitions
One of the important roles of the Protocol was to set forth various generally
acceptable definitions for many important terms, allowing for consistency in use.
Since the Protocol was intended to be a legally binding international instrument, a
lot of time went into these definitions-almost a year was spent trying to define with
precision exactly what is covered under the term "living modified organism." It was
decided that the generic term "genetically modified organism" would not be used
since the negotiators felt a more scientifically precise definition was needed.
These definitions are found in Article 3.4 For example, Article 3(g) defines
"living modified organism" to mean "any living organism that possesses a novel
combination of genetic material obtained through the use of modern biotechnology."
"'Living organism' means any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating
genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids.,, 5 "'Modern
biotechnology' means the application of: (i) In vitro nucleic acid techniques,
including recombinant DNA and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or
organelles, (ii) Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome natural
physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques
used in traditional breeding and selection." 6 With such definitions in place, the scope
of the Protocol is more fixed, the process more certain, and future negotiations can
be more focused.
2. Scope andApplication of the Protocol
Human pharmaceuticals were left largely untouched by the Protocol and were
left subject to individual country jurisdiction. This exemption applies where other
relevant international agreements or organizations-those that would fall under the

4.
5.
6.

See Protocol, supranote 1, art. 3.
Id. art. 3(h).
Id. art. 3(i).
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jurisdiction of the World Health Organization instruments, for example-address
this area.
Also exempted are applications of "contained use."8 The contained use
exemption focuses on physical structures, to insure that LMOs are controlled by
specific measures that effectively limit their contact with or impact on the external
environment. Of course, this is a very important definition.
Excepted from the application of the advanced informed agreement (AIA) 9
process were "living modified organisms intended for direct uses as food feed or for
processing ' 1 -in essence, the commodity movement of grains and such. However,
when domestic approval of such products occurs, the parties must be notified of
such use through the Biosafety Clearinghouse." This introduces a notice that
triggers a country review under the Protocol. There is also a mandate that any
shipments of these products contain language that says they "may contain"
genetically modified organisms and are "not intended for introduction into the
environment."12
Importantly, some countries do not have regulations in place under which they
can make judgments about the acceptability or non-acceptability of LMOs or
GMOs. The Protocol recognizes that such countries have jurisdiction to make these
judgments and specifically allows them to make judgments on the basis of the risk
assessment information provided for through the Protocol's processes, regardless of
whether there is a regulation in place.
The primary focus of the instrument is LMOs intended for introduction into the
environment, 13 and particularly to the first intentional transboundary movement of
an LMO. These are subjected to a full advanced informed agreement process, with
4
appropriate notices of actions and so forth.'
B. ProtocolProcedures
The basic process has already been alluded to. Since the Protocol focused on the
transboundary movement of LMOs, the procedures of the Protocol are triggered
where LMOs may be moved across borders. Two basic scenarios trigger the

7.
See id. art. 5. "[W]ithout prejudice to any right of a Party to subject all living modified organisms to risk
assessment prior to the making of decisions on import, this Protocol shall not apply to the transboundary movement
of living modified organisms which are pharmaceuticals for humans that are addressed by other relevant
international agreements or organisations."
8.
See id.art. 3(b). "'Contained use' means any operation, undertaken within a facility, installation or other
physical structure, which involves living modified organisms that are controlled by specific measures that
effectively limit their contact with, and their impact on, the external environment."
9.
See id. art. 10.
10. Id. art. 7(2).
11. Id. art. l1l.
12.
13.
14.

Id. art. 18(2)(a).
Id. art. 7.
See id. arts. 8-10, 12.
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Protocol. The first is where an LMO is intended for introduction into the
environment, and the second where it is intended for food, feed or processing (such
as commodity grains). For each scenario, there is a defined event that triggers the
advanced informed agreement process. Where an LMO is intended for introduction
into the environment, such as seeds for growing, propagation, etc., the process is
triggered with the first import into an importing country. The Advanced Informed
Agreement (AIA) mandates a risk assessment as part of the consideration in
evaluating that import.
For those LMOs intended for food, feed and processing, the approval for first
commercial planting is the trigger. Upon the first planting, clearinghouse notice and
reviews at the country level are triggered.
The chart below schematically tries to explain that process-the light area
represents national jurisdiction, the darker areas show jurisdiction that derives from
the Biosafety Protocol, including both the Clearinghouse and the AIA process. Also
illustrated is the fact that various types of applications of this technology are subject
to different processes shown as pathways along the matrix.
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Contained uses subject to exporting country actions, for example, are also
subject to clearinghouse notification. There is a right to review that is recognized by
the Convention for transient countries and the importing country exercises its own
jurisdiction over contained uses such as research or shipment.
IV. KEY IssuEs AND POINTS OF CONTENTION
A. Relation to Other InternationalInstruments
One of the most important aspects to the application of the Protocol is its
relation to other international instruments, particularly the agreements administered
by the WTO. The Protocol was drafted with conscious regard to the many other
agreements already in existence that touch on these subjects. It was not drafted in
a void. To the disappointment of some, it was not an attempt to construct a new legal
regime from scratch. The preamble language, for example, states:
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually
supportive with a view to achieving sustainable development,
Emphasizing that this Protocol should not be interpreted as implying a
change in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing
international agreements,
Understanding that the above recital is not intended
to subordinate this
5
Protocol to other international agreements[.]1
This language is supremely ambiguous. The uncontentious line is in front: "yes, we
should all be mutually supportive." Then it emphasizes that the Protocol should not
be interpreted as implying a change in rights and obligations of a signatory party
under any existing international agreements. This language protects the interests of
those who want to make sure that countries cannot use the Protocol to ignore6
obligations under the existing Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards of the WTO.
Those obligations require that if a country takes action to protect their health or
environment, they must have some foundation in science and some evidence in a
risk assessment, or that they have to be pursuing science to find those answers.
Of course, the third paragraph cited contains the understanding that the
preceding language is not intended to subordinate the Protocol to other international
agreements. It can be argued the third phrase functions to nullify the second. And,
this is an example of the ability to finesse very complex issues and leaving little

15. Protocol, supra note 1, pmbl.
16. Preagreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1226 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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smidgens for everybody that has a stake to grab hold of and say "this is good, this
supports my perspective," while the opposition is saying the same thing.
Some of this ambiguity was in response to the so-called "clean" savings clause,
which had been proposed, to incorporate the idea that the Protocol "shall not affect
the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party deriving from any existing
international agreement." There is a parallel statement in the CBD with a little
exemption at the bottom which says, in essence, "except where this might cause
serious harm to'biodiversity."' 7 We favored a "clean" savings clause-keyed back
to the SPS agreements. The end-result, however, was a compromise patterned after
a similar compromise negotiated in the Convention on Prior Informed Consent (PIC)
for chemicals.8
B. PrecautionaryLanguage
The precautionary language included in the Protocol was also a very interesting
and very important discussion. The language is contained in Article 10, setting forth
the AIA, and Article 11, dealing with commodities.
Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient relevant scientific
information and knowledge regarding the extent of the potential adverse
effects of a living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity in the Party of import, taking also into account
human risks to human health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a
decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of that living modified
organism intended [for direct use as food or feed, or for
processing] in order
19
to avoid or minimize such potential adverse effects.
What this says regarding the extent of potential adverse effects is important. By
implication, this suggests that we have some scientific information to indicate that
there is an adverse effect. Frankly, this suggestion is very much in dispute right now
with respect to LMOs, particularly in certain applications. The impact has to be on
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. The language regarding
20
"taking into account risks to human health" was pulled right out of the Convention.
There was never a consensus about this language's interpretation. This means that

17. Protocol, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
18. See Convention on Prior Informed Consent, Jan. 1999,38 I.L.M. 1, 1 [hereinafter PIC]. "Recognizing
that trade and environmental policies should be mutually supportive with a view to achieving sustainable
development; Emphasizing that nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as implying in any way a change
in the rights and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreement applying to chemicals in
international trade or to environmental protection; Understanding that the above recital is not intended to create a
hierarchy between this Convention and other international agreements."
19. Protocol, supranote 1, arts. 10(6) & 11(8).
20. CBD, supra note 2, art. 8(g).
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these clauses will have to be interpreted by the challenges to actions under the
Protocol. The actions, however, have to be taken in order to minimize the potential
adverse effects that are identified in the additional reference to scientific uncertainty.
From our perspective, this is an acceptable framing of precautionary language.
However, this form of the "precautionary principle" differs slightly from the framing
that is referenced in the objective, which is Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration,
which states, "[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation. 21
The version that appeared in the Pre-Montreal draft text (Article 8.7) read,
"[l]ack of full scientific certainty or scientific consensus regarding the potential
adverse effects of a living modified organism shall not prevent the Party of import
from prohibiting the import of the living modified organism in question." This was
somewhat more direct. The difference in the final result is going to invite challenge
and confusion and we would have preferred not to see that difference.
The language contained in the SPS Agreement offers a somewhat more detailed
approach:
In cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member may
provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of
available pertinent information, including that from the relevant
international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary
measures applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall
seek to obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective
assessment of risk and review the sanitary 22
or phytosanitary measure
accordingly within a reasonable period of time.
It is important to look at the SPS language in context-where relative scientific
information is insufficient, a member may provisionally adopt phytosanitary
standards on the basis of available and pertinent information. They face an
obligation to obtain additional information necessary in order to get a more
objective and complete picture of the situation within a reasonable time period.
From our perspective, this is also appropriate precautionary language.
The precautionary language of the SPS is already embedded in existing law
under the WTO agreements. It enables any country that feels they have some cause
for concern about risk to plant or human health, to stop shipments. The reason why
industry was so concerned about efforts to put vague language regarding a

21.
22.

Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Sept. 2000,39 I.L.M. 1027, art. I and pmbl.
SPS Agreement, supra note 16, art. 5(7).
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precautionary principle into the Protocol was that existing international law allows
a country to take action based on any scientific indication of a potential risk, even
if there are significant uncertainties associated with it. The question is therefore
raised: what are we trying to do by inserting a new level of precautionary language
into this process?
Our concern was that some were trying to create an opportunity to take actions
that are not founded in any scientific indication of potential harm. That is not to say
that there are no non-scientific reasons why countries might want to restrict these
imports, or that such reasons are not legitimate. However, the concern lies in the
implications multiple forms of such a fundamental principle would have on the
overall integrity of a rules-based trading regime. That larger system of rules was not
being debated in conjunction with the Protocol. We felt that to open up that
argument in the narrow context of this Protocol, being negotiated largely by
environment ministers with their ministerial biases, would have significant negative
implications for the integrity of a rules-based trading regime. We felt the issue was
much broader than the subject of biotechnology-that such an opening was
inappropriate and, because of the allowance that is already embedded in the SPS
agreements, not necessary.
V. CONCLUSION

From the point of view of the biotechnology industry, the Protocol is a good
step towards a workable regulatory trade regime. The Protocol responds to broad
industry concerns, and as drafted it retains the basic rights of recourse to WTO. That
was important to us. But it also includes enough ambiguity to keep alive debate
regarding Multilateral Environmental Agreements such as this Protocol, and their
relation to the WTO. The conflicting, precedent-setting precautionary language will
invite tests and challenge that will add impetus to the "precautionary principle"
debate domestically as well as globally. But our sense is that this instrument is
clearly framed in a general context of a science-and risk assessment-based
system, and that is how it will be interpreted going forward.
With respect to specific concerns of the biotechnology industry, we believe the
Protocol responds to increasing global pressures for governmental intervention. It
focuses appropriately on LMOs intended for release, and applies a science/risk
approach to the AIA process and country-level commodity review, which is legally
appropriate. It neither resolves nor compromises the commodity issue-that issue
is still alive. The language regarding "may contain" LMOs is a temporary fix to an
issue that will ultimately have to be resolved in the marketplace and through
bilateral negotiations.
This instrument advances the debates on the overall issue of MEAs versus the
WTO, and on the role of the science and risk without biasing or dictating an ultimate
outcome. The debate will go on, but the stakes are now higher. It provides a
foundation that could yield a rational framework for commerce in products utilizing

2001 / The CartagenaProtocol-A FirstStep to a Global Biosafety Structure?
biotechnology, but the current battles in the marketplace and for the minds and
hearts of the public will continue.
In the final analysis, we see the Cartagena Protocol as a workable agreement.
It is probably more significant for the fact that it achieved political consensus than
for any instrumental effect that it will have in shaping the larger public debate over
biotechnology. That debate will go on independent of this instrument, but because
of the ambiguities that have been negotiated into it, the future will require a great
deal of effort by all the countries to keep it on track and build upon the political
consensus that spawned it.

